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ABSTRACT China has developed a more consequential role in Sudan
over the past two decades, during which it has become bound up in
the combination of enduring violent internal instability and protracted exter-
nal adversity that has characterized the politics of the central state since the
1989 Islamist revolution. Two inter-related political trajectories of China’s
Sudan engagement are examined here. The first concerns Beijing’s relations
with the ruling National Congress party in incorporating China into its
domestic politics and foreign relations amidst war in Darfur, to which
Beijing has responded through a more engaged political role. The second
confronts the practical limitations of China’s sovereignty doctrine and
exclusive reliance upon relations with the central state. Following the
peace agreement of 2005 that ended the North–South war, and motivated
by political imperatives linked to investment protection concerns, China
has developed new relations with the semi-autonomous Government of
Southern Sudan, thus seeking to position itself to navigate Sudan’s uncertain
political future.
The official golden jubilee anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and
Sudan was formally marked on 4 February 2009, 50 years after Sudan became
the fourth diplomatic mission China established in Africa. A month later, on
4 March, the anniversary celebrations were comprehensively overshadowed
when Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court, issuing its first
ever arrest warrant for a serving president, accused Sudan’s President Omar
Hassan al-Bashir of five counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of
war crimes. External coverage of these two historic events exemplified and con-
tinued the prevailing contrast between Sudan as an issue in China’s African and
international relations and China’s engagement within Sudan. China’s relations
with Sudan have been a prominent part of its recent international politics,
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most conspicuously in the build-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, but China has also
developed amore established, consequential rolewithin Sudan.This has received less
attention, apart from such episodes as the killing of five Chinese oil workers in
October 2008 by rebel forces in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan region, which high-
lighted the distance between official narratives of golden bilateral relations and the
greater complexity of China’s involvement in Sudanese politics at large.
This article considers how China’s involvement in and relation to Sudanese
politics has developed over the past two decades. As the result of a combination
of a more established economic position and recurring crises within and outside
Sudan, this reflects a basic underlying change in China’s Sudan relations. During
the Maoist period until the early 1990s, People’s China mobilized a “thick” ideo-
logical foreign relations rhetoric – of sovereignty, equality, non-interference and
solidarity – amidst what was mostly a “thin” content of actual aid, trade and pol-
itical relations in Sudan. More recently, and especially since the advent of oil
investment after the mid-1990s, the expansion of China’s relations with Sudan
have meant that key foreign policy principles have been spread in a “thinner”
manner over a “thickening” content.1 The development of increasingly substan-
tive material and political interests has entailed a more politically consequential
role for China in Sudan and, in turn, an impact by Sudan on China’s inter-
national politics. The political evolution of the National Islamic Front since it
seized power in 1989 has been central to China’s changing engagement.
Amidst conflict and instability in Sudan, the government in Khartoum faced pro-
tracted external adversity and turned to China as its key international sponsor.
For Beijing and Khartoum, in other words, what took off after 1989 as a genuine
case of mutual state-to-state benefit largely unencumbered by political compli-
cations developed into a more embedded, strategic and multi-stranded engage-
ment. At the same time, the Chinese government has maintained the core
principles directing its bilateral relations with Sudan – most importantly sover-
eignty and non-interference – but these have proved problematic to the point
of being inadequate in managing new challenges. Beijing has therefore responded
by deepening its political engagement.
The primary aim here is to begin to explore China’s role in Sudanese politics by
examining two important and inter-related manifestations of China’s changing
engagement with Northern and Southern Sudan amidst the coexistence of
ongoing conflict in Darfur and a formal North–South peace.2 The first concerns
the development of more complex relations between China and the central state
under the National Islamic Front, which was reconstituted as the National
Congress Party (NCP). On the one hand, China’s support for and association
1 Adapting Michael Walzer’s Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).
2 Sudan’s impact on Chinese foreign policy and the nature of China’s international diplomacy over
Darfur are important, closely related questions, but space does not allow proper treatment here.
Additionally, knowledge gaps about aspects of China’s political relations with Sudan preclude detailed
treatment of certain issues at this stage.
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with the governing NCP has rendered it subject to threats within Sudan from orga-
nized armed opponents of the central state, necessitating efforts to protect its invest-
ment. In foreign policy terms, on the other hand, the NCP’s political agency
integrated Beijing into its foreign relations manoeuvring with the result that
Beijing needed to respond and manage divergent interests with Khartoum. The
second manifestation exposes the limitations of China’s sovereignty doctrine and
its adaptation to new political imperatives. The principle of state sovereignty does
not fit well with the nature of changing politics in Sudan and the fact that the central
state is unable to exert effective control over all its territory. TheChinese government
has had to adapt to these conditions and negotiate a position in Sudanese politics
beyond the formally sovereign political centre. The establishment of a semi-
autonomous government in Southern Sudan after the peace agreement of 2005,
reinforced by the possibility of Southern secession after 2011, compelled the develop-
ment of quasi-sovereign political relations with the Government of Southern Sudan.
A New Actor: China and Sudanese Politics
Recent attention to China–Sudan relations has tended to privilege Beijing’s inter-
national diplomacy over Darfur.3 Three main contending narratives can be ident-
ified that in different ways account for China’s evolving Sudan policy. The first
and most prominent is a realist explanation identifying China’s strategic diplo-
macy as motivated by defence of economic interests (oil), a function of its energy
security imperative, closely connected to power politics and geostrategic compe-
tition with the United States. In this logic, which stresses economic causation and
power politics, China is a self-interested external power extracting resources for
its own benefit and that of a predatory ruling elite.4 Chinese accounts alterna-
tively point to American regime-change designs on Sudan or the allied objectives
of “political” Western NGOs. The second, broadly social constructivist explana-
tory strand holds that external advocacy catalysed a normative evolution in
Beijing towards a more constructive engagement on Sudan particularly in
relation to Darfur: Chinese diplomacy changed from passive, blind support for
Khartoum to more active involvement in pressure politics aimed at ending con-
flict.5 Finally, while there are highly critical accounts of China’s investment,6 offi-
cial Chinese and official Sudanese positions argue a more classical liberal case in
3 See, for example, Jonathan Holslag, “China’s diplomatic manoeuvring on the question of Darfur,”
Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 17, No. 54 (2008), pp. 71–84; Chin-Hao Huang, “US China
relations and Darfur,” Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 31 (2008), pp. 827–42.
4 For example, Eric Reeves, “China in Sudan: underwriting genocide,” testimony before the US–China
Economic and Security Review Commission: “China’s role in the world: is China a responsible stake-
holder?” 3 August 2006.
5 Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, “China, the unlikely human rights champion,” Policy
Innovations (The Carnegie Council, 14 February 2007); and “Beijing’s new dictatorship diplomacy,”
Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008.
6 See, for example, Ali Askouri, “China’s investment in Sudan: displacing villages and destroying commu-
nities,” in Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks (eds.), African Perspectives on China in Africa (Oxford:
Fahamu, 2007), pp. 71–86.
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highlighting a positive role, emphasizing the benefits of rising trade and economic
growth for peace in Sudan. All positions may account for certain dynamics of
China’s engagement and raise important issues, but have generally neglected to
ground such engagement fully within Sudan.7 The ways in which China’s invol-
vement has developed within, influenced and itself been affected by Sudanese
politics since 1989 is thus worthy of further consideration.8
A new phase of Chinese engagement in a longer history of connections with
Sudan has unfolded over the past two decades. That China had a minor position
in post-colonial Sudanese historiography until recently is indicative of its pre-
viously restricted – or “thin” – role in Sudan.9 It never amounted to a factor
of particular consequence in Sudanese politics until the growth of ties after
1989 in general and the late 1990s, when serious oil operations began, in particu-
lar. Contemporary relations are thus deepening a comparatively short history of
substantive relations. Prior to oil investment, China’s relations with Sudan were,
for the most part, more symbolic than politically consequential. Although con-
nected by ancient ties and a colourful colonial past,10 and despite a history of
Chinese aid, trade and cultural links with Sudan after 1959, China did not
play an important part in Sudan’s politics and foreign relations after the coun-
try’s independence in 1956.11 This is not to discount history. Nor is it to dismiss
the ways in which historical narratives continue to inform – and be mobilized to
legitimate – political relations. It is merely to assert that for all the recurring elite
7 The realist position notably discounts the importance of the political principles informing Chinese diplo-
macy; the constructivist position can convey a misleading teleology of a Chinese shift on Darfur, dis-
counting flourishing business amidst an underlying continuation of China’s support to Khartoum,
and arguments prioritizing the benefits of Chinese investment fail to locate this properly within the
longer and more recent history of Sudanese politics characterized by a politically and economically
dominant centre.
8 For a notable exception, see Sharath Srinivasan, “A marriage less convenient: China, Sudan and
Darfur,” in Kweku Ampiah and Sanusah Naidu (eds.), Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Africa and
China (Durban: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2008), pp. 55–85.
9 The comparative lack of Chinese scholarship on Sudanese politics until recently reflects history and
more generic research constraints. Xu Liang, “Zhongguo de Sudan wenti yanjiu zongshu (1949–
2006)” (“Summary of studies on Sudan issues (1949–2006)”), Xiya Feizhou (West Asia and Africa),
No. 2 (2007), p. 71.
10 The historically grounded political foundations of China’s modern relations with Sudan, in contempor-
ary political rhetoric conveying a unique, special relationship, is most vividly articulated in the figure of
“Chinese” Gordon. He made his name in China, being present when the Summer Palace was sacked in
1850 and serving as commander of the Ever-Victorious Army militia against the Taiping rebels from
March 1863. Gordon later served as governor general of the Turko-Egyptian Sudan, famously meeting
his death in Khartoum at the hands of Mahdist rebels in 1885. For Premier Zhou Enlai, notably during
his state visit to Khartoum in 1964, and for a secession of Chinese political, civilian and military visitors
to Sudan, Gordon has symbolized a common experience of shared colonial oppression. In the official
narrative, the Sudanese succeeded in exacting revenge on Gordon for China in what is portrayed as
an act of just anti-colonial resistance.
11 Reinforcing this idea, the nature and impact of China’s post-1989 engagement represents an actual and
perceived contrast with previous periods: the role of People’s China in Sudan, in which aid and cotton
trade were foremost, is generally remembered positively whereas key defining episodes in the latest phase
of relations, such as wartime oil operations in Southern Sudan or Beijing’s support for Khartoum over
Darfur, have had a far more critical reception. See Ali Abdalla Ali, The Sudanese–Chinese Relations
Before and After Oil (Khartoum: Sudan Currency Printing Press, 2006); Daniel Large, “Old friend,
new actor: notes on the history of Sudan–China relations,” Sudan Studies, No. 37 (2008), pp. 39–52.
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discourse of historical, “all-weather” friendship, China has only comparatively
recently emerged as Sudan’s single most important economic partner and exter-
nal ally with a more involved political role, as part of a logic of “thickening”
engagement that has seen China’s position as a “new actor” in Sudan develop
and change.12
China’s relations with Sudan today must be located in relation to the politics
and evolution of the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime that seized power on
30 June 1989. This followed a pre-existing pattern of state rule conditioned by the
formative historical periods that shaped modern Sudan. The overarching charac-
teristic of political governance bequeathed by colonialism, which would be pro-
minently articulated and practised in the NIF’s project of political Islam, is a
deep authoritarianism linked to belief in the cultural superiority of those control-
ling the central state.13 Modern Sudan has been governed by a “hyper-dominant
but unstable political centre.”14 The main regions in Sudan’s periphery – the
south, east and west – have experienced economic and political marginalization,
contributing to a series of interlocking conflicts. These importantly include the
protracted armed conflict following rebellion that spread in Southern Sudan
after 1983, led by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M)
under John Garang, its commander-in-chief. This conflict would result in over
two million deaths, the internal displacement of more than four million people
and around half a million refugees. As peace negotiations between the govern-
ment and the SPLM proceeded, conflict spread in Sudan’s western region of
Darfur; in short, it was “the war in Southern Sudan speeded up.”15 A particularly
intense and devastating government-sponsored counter-insurgency campaign was
carried out between 2003 and 2004, following an attack by the rebel Sudan
Liberation Army on a government airbase in el-Fasher, Darfur in April 2003.16
From Entry to Established Interests: China’s Relations
with Northern Sudan
The interplay between the NIF’s revolutionary Islamic politics at home and its
expansionist ambition abroad created a pattern of recurring crises and adversar-
ial foreign relations. The NIF’s own politics would evolve but its difficult early
foreign relations set the mould for what was to come insofar as they compounded
Sudan’s isolation in the Middle East and attracted international pressure.17
12 Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, 1995), p. 383.
13 See Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Oxford: James Currey, 2003); Justin
Willis, “Ambitions of the state,” in The Sudan Handbook (London: Rift Valley Institute, forthcoming);
see also Peter Woodward, Sudan, 1989–1989: The Unstable State (Boulder: Rienner, 1990).
14 Alex de Waal, “Sudan: the turbulent state,” in Alex de Waal (ed.), War in Darfur and the Search for
Peace (London: Justice Africa, 2007), p. 20.
15 John Ryle, “Disaster in Darfur,” New York Review of Books, Vol. 51, No. 13 (2004).
16 See Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A New History of a Long War (London: Zed, 2008 (2nd ed.)).
17 Including through the regime’s most influential figure, Hassan al-Turabi, who supported Saddam
Hussein in August 1990 and made efforts to organize and export political Islam. The NIF’s terrorist
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The Chinese government was approached for assistance amidst protracted civil
war, an American-led containment policy and international sanctions against
Khartoum. Regarded as a friendly, resource rich state, Sudan was targeted as a
long-term overseas oil supply base and as an arena to support the global develop-
ment of Chinese corporations.18 Bilateral relations deepened in a relatively low-
profile manner, enabled more by circumstances and the unintended consequences
of Western foreign policy than any natural political affinity. For China, Sudan was
a model site of engagement in Africa predating the expansion of its relations with
the continent after 2000.19 Bilateral relations were framed in terms of the political
facilitation of an economics-in-command model spearheaded by oil investment.
This approach, a strong contrast to the confrontation and pressure politics of the
United States in particular, suited the NIF perfectly and its leaders placed particu-
lar value on China’s policy of “no strings or political interference.”20
China’s economic relations with Northern Sudan have developed from a com-
paratively minor position to the country’s most important external economic
partner. The Chinese commercial expansion in Sudan did not take place in a vac-
uum but rather entered a political economy in which other external players had
been and would continue to be active.21 Sudan, however, has become a centre of
established Chinese economic interests, which have continued to expand in recent
years. Oil remains at the heart of relations and dominates Sudan’s trade with
China. Sudan was China’s sixth-largest oil supplier in 2007, accounting for
6 per cent of China’s total crude imports; Sudan has been a key theatre in
China’s African equity oil investment.22 China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC)–International Sudan operates the largest stakes in the country’s two
most important oil consortiums, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating
Company and Petrodar, whose main producing blocks are located across the
transitional North–South border zone and in Southern Sudan.23 Sudan remains
footnote continued
links, most notably the attempted assassination in Addis Ababa of the Egyptian president in June 1995,
resulted in the US designating Sudan a state sponsor of terrorism in 12 August 1993. There followed UN
sanctions in 1996, US sanctions in 1997 and an American missile attack on a pharmaceutical factory in
Khartoum in 1998.
18 Yun Zongguo, “Sudan shiyou kaifa xiangmu qianjing guangkuo” (“Prospects for Sudan oil develop-
ment project broad”), Guoji jingji hezuo (International Economic Co-operation), No. 5 (1997), pp. 22–
23; “Zhongguo gongren zoujin Sudan” (‘Chinese workers enter Sudan’), Shijie zhishi (World
Knowledge), No. 9 (2004), pp. 42–43.
19 See Linda Jakobson and Zha Daojing, “China and the worldwide search for oil security,” Asia-Pacific
Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), pp. 60–73.
20 See Awad al-Jaz, “The oil of Sudan: challenges and achievements,” in Peter Gwynvay Hopkins (ed.),
The Kenana Handbook of Sudan (London: Kegan Paul, 2007), p. 673.
21 See Daniel Large, “Sudan’s foreign relations with Asia: China and the politics of “looking east,” ISS
Paper 158 (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008).
22 See Erica. S. Downs, “The fact and fiction of Sino-African energy relations,” China Security, Vol. 3,
No. 3 (2007), pp. 42–68.
23 CNPC has a 40% stake in the Greater Nile consortium, which operates blocks 1, 2 and 4 and began
exporting good-quality Nile blend crude in August 1999. Output from these blocks declined from a
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China’s third largest trade partner in Africa. Total trade has grown steadily, reaching
US$5.7 billion in 2007, with Chinese (manufactured) exports to Sudan growing
appreciably over the past decade.24 Oil investment has underpinned the subsequent
expansion of a more diverse array of Chinese business and a fuller spectrum of
business activities.25 Economic relations are, however, asymmetrical: in narrow econ-
omic terms, China’s importance to Sudan far exceeds Sudan’s importance to China.
Political and corporate elites have been instrumental in directing bilateral
relations. The Chinese government has cultivated effective, close political
relations with Sudan’s ruling leadership. From the early stages under Jiang
Zemin to the deepening of ties under Hu Jintao, China’s political relations
have been directed by senior leaders and supported by different branches of
government.26 Key NCP leaders have been involved in managing China
relations.27 A second area of political co-operation occurs on a party–party
basis between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the NCP. This has
involved rituals of rhetorical solidarity and more active expressions of support
by the CCP for the NCP28 (also appearing, at times, to entail economic
diplomacy29). The NCP reciprocates through support for Beijing’s One China
footnote continued
peak of nearly 300,000bpd to around 235,000bpd at the end of 2007. CNPC has a 41% stake in
Petrodar, whose two blocks (3 and 7) came onstream in April 2006 and in which Sinopec, active in
Sudan’s downstream sub-contracting, has a 6% stake. CNPC also has a 95% stake in Block 6, which
produces very poor quality oil mainly for domestic consumption in Sudan. CNPC is an operator of
the partly deepwater Block 15 in Sudan and, at the end of June 2007, took at 40% stake in offshore
Block 13. For background, see Luke Patey, “A complex reality: the strategic behaviour of multinational
oil corporations and the new wars in Sudan,” Copenhagen, DIIS Report, 2006.
24 According to the Bank of Sudan, China’s proportion of Sudan’s imports have increased from 8% in
2002 to 20.8% in 2006. China exports mostly manufactured products to Sudan.
25 Recent growth sectors include telecommunications and agricultural co-operation. In June 2008 a proto-
col on agricultural co-operation was signed in Beijing by the Sudanese and Chinese Ministers of
Agriculture, al-Zubair Bashir Taha and Shen Zhengcai. The construction sector has seen particular
increased activity by Chinese companies, notably in infrastructure projects (bridges, roads, railways,
dams).
26 Governmental relations are structured into official co-operation channels, with the Joint Sudanese–
Chinese Ministerial Committee, which has alternated between Khartoum and Beijing and held its eighth
meeting in Beijing in December 2007, playing a leading role.
27 These, unsurprisingly, represent key members of the NIF, from President Bashir, who first visited
Beijing in November 1990, to the role of technical management through the long-term Energy
Minister and current Minister of Finance, Awad Ahmed al-Jaz, who played a pivotal role in the oil
sector.
28 Seen, for example, in the CCP’s message of congratulation and “admiration” to the NCP’s general con-
ference in November 2005. Political support for the NCP was notably expressed on 22 March 2009 when
vice-minister Li Jinjun of the International Department of the CCP’s Central Committee spoke of the
CCP’s rejection of the International Criminal Court and its ongoing support for Sudan. “Chinese del-
egation in Sudan for golden jubilee gala,” Sudanese Media Centre, Khartoum, 22 March 2009.
29 In December 2008, a CCP “goodwill” delegation led by Chen Jiwa, deputy secretary of the CCP’s
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Regional Committee, visited Sudan at the invitation of the NCP. It
held meetings with senior NCP politicians and the governor of the Khartoum State, but also discussed
Guangxi’s business ties with Sudan. “Sudan, China discuss political and economic relations,” Sudan
Tribune, 25 December 2008.
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policy and occasional gestures of practical assistance to the CCP.30 Military
co-operation and arms supplies constitute a third, less documented but neverthe-
less significant area of state links between China and the Northern government.31
A final strand of relations operates between Chinese state-owned enterprises, the
NCP and central state ministries in Sudan, in what amounts to a corporate-state
nexus that is particularly important in “energy co-operation.”32
The NCP and China: Domestic and External Impacts
China’s engagement has been conditioned most by the political evolution of the
NIF/NCP. While the Chinese government has successfully cultivated relations with
the NCP, this very entity has also been responsible for the domestic conflict that
has been such a source of global political controversy for Beijing arising from its
steadfast support of Khartoum. The evolution of – and conflict within – the
regime after the 1989 revolution is complex.33 The defining event was an internal
power struggle in 1999 that saw President Bashir prevail over Hassan el-Turabi,
the de facto ruler of Sudan after 1989, as part of a retreat of political Islam and
the ascendancy of military rule over that of the Islamist ideologues.34 The NCP
developed a more pragmatic approach,35 together with a powerful security
apparatus and an economic base. Its domestic and foreign relations combined to
politicize China’s role within Sudan and to incorporate Beijing into its foreign
relations defence.
30 During a visit by an NCP delegation to Beijing in July 2008, a senior NCP politician, Mustafa Osman
Ismail, donated US$100,000 to the CCP to aid China’s response to the Sichuan earthquake. “CCP to
promote co-operation with Sudan’s National Congress,” Xinhua, 9 July 2008.
31 This thickened following an exploratory trip to Beijing by the Chief of Staff of the Sudan Armed Forces
in March 2002, but military relations have a longer history dating to 1971 in particular when the PRC
assisted President Nimeiri. Different Sudanese sources attribute Chinese technical assistance in building
arms factories near Khartoum in the late 1990s, but Sudan’s indigenous arms manufacturing capability
remains somewhat opaque. On 7 January 2002, the government of Sudan reportedly paraded the hard-
ware produced in its military complex to the public in Khartoum’s Green Square. Tanks based on the
T-55 – dubbed the Bashir-1, Zubeir-1 and the Abu-Fatima-1 – were showcased. See Daniel Large,
“Arms, oil and Darfur: the evolution of relations between China and Sudan,” Small Arms Survey
Issue Brief No. 7, August 2007.
32 For example, Sudan’s current Minister of Energy and Mining, Al-Zubayr Ahmad al-Hasan, visited
China in August 2008 at the invitation of CNCP officially to discuss co-operation between his ministry
and CNCP. He also attended the inauguration of the Beijing Olympics (“Minister of Energy and Mining
visits China,” Suna (Khartoum), 12 August 2008).
33 See Alex de Waal (ed.), Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2004); J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan
al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989-2000 (Leiden: Brill, 2003).
34 See Abdullahi A. Galab, The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in the
Sudan (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).
35 One China-related illustration of this was demonstrated in 1999 through the “affair of the Chinese loan,”
which for Einas Ahmed illustrated a willingness by the NCP “to submit religion to reasons of state and
sometimes to their own particular interests.” Despite Sudan’s Islamic banking system, the body charged
with oversight of finance with Sharia law invoked a jurisprudence of necessity to allow the government
to accept a Chinese loan requiring interest payments. Einas Ahmed, “Political Islam in Sudan: Islamists
and the challenge of state power (1989–2004),” in Benjamin F. Soares and Rene Otayek (eds.), Islam and
Muslim Politics in Africa (Palgrave, New York: 2007), pp. 189–208.
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Chinese investment and political support has contributed substantially to the
NCP’s rule, and the resulting close association between China and the NCP
has politicized China’s position amongst organized armed opponents of the
Sudan government. This has drawn Chinese oil operations further into the poli-
tics of conflict in Sudan. China’s status as a potential proxy in armed anti-state
politics was not new.36 In contrast to the militarized creation of Sudan’s oil
export industry in the late 1990s, China’s more politicized role occurred in the
context of established, functioning oil operations. These expanded after 2005
and fuelled an oil-boom that visibly further concentrated economic benefits in
Khartoum, sharpening the discourse of economic marginalization and political
domination mobilized by rebel groups in Darfur. Like the SPLA previously,
Darfurian rebel groups regard China’s role as not just partisan but also politically
inseparable from the central state under the NCP and its leaders, the architects of
a brutal counter-insurgency campaign in Darfur.
The particular vulnerability to anti-government violence of Chinese oil oper-
ations, which are more exposed than other key oil investors from India and
Malaysia, has underscored China’s deepening political involvement and corre-
spondingly elevated the need for investment protection into a higher priority
for Beijing. Two incidents illustrating this are worth noting. In the first significant
episode where Chinese interests were explicitly targeted in the context of the
Darfur conflict, the Darfurian rebel Justice and Equality Movement attacked
Chinese oil operations in Defra, Kordofan in October 2007 and issued an ulti-
matum to Beijing to withdraw from Sudan within one week. The second, far
more serious incident happened in October 2008 when nine Chinese CNPC
workers were abducted in Southern Kordofan near the Abyei region, an oil
rich flashpoint area in a contested border zone between Northern and
Southern Sudan. Five were subsequently killed by forces under a commander
claiming affiliation with the Justice and Equality Movement, who had previously
fought for the central government against the SPLA before turning against
Khartoum. Citing the lack of local benefits from oil wealth and continuing
underdevelopment, he asserted that “China supports the Khartoum government
militarily and helps it marginalize our region. But our case is with the govern-
ment in Khartoum.”37 After the incident, the Chinese government despatched
an assessment mission led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and involving repre-
sentatives of the Ministry of Commerce and CNPC,38 who recommended new
measures aimed at enhancing security. Threats and attacks against their own
36 In the late 1990s, amidst the process of oil development that was inseparable from patterns of conflict
and civilian displacement in Southern Sudan, the SPLA regarded China as an enemy since it provided
political, economic and military support for the government of Sudan. The first incident that clouded
China’s oil investment came in March 2004 when two Chinese oil workers were kidnapped by anti-
government militia and later released.
37 “Sudan: rebel says Chinese hostages moved to area government forces cannot reach,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat
website, 25 October 2008 (via BBC monitoring).
38 “Chinese team in Sudan visits four rescued Chinese hostages,” Xinhua (in English), 31 October 2008.
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interests provided a self-interested reason for Beijing to promote conflict resol-
ution in Sudan and was one driver of a more active Chinese political engagement.
Largely as a result of changing Sudanese domestic politics, then, what for
China had been relatively straightforward bilateral relations facilitating economic
investment became entangled in the NCP’s foreign relations. The NCP, which
has been a far from passive recipient of Chinese assistance, incorporated China
into its foreign relations strategy as its key international sponsor. Beijing was will-
ing to support Khartoum for a mixture of reasons related to economic interests
and political concerns, notably over sovereignty, and China’s support enabled the
NCP to pursue a course that would otherwise have been unlikely. However,
instrumental in China’s mostly reactive policy engagement over Darfur has
been the NCP’s exercise of political agency, that is, its pursuit of tactical, defen-
sive diplomatic manoeuvring in a path of resistance that at times ran contrary to
China’s interests, but in which China nevertheless remained vital. The principles
that facilitated China’s entry into Sudan came to constrain Beijing in the face of
an unco-operative NCP under President Bashir that pursued a course of action
damaging to China’s international reputation. The politics of Darfur
in particular required new tactics and political practices that stretched – without,
in Beijing’s view, contradicting – their meaning.
The Chinese government responded with a more engaged political role featur-
ing continued support for the NCP and pressure upon its senior leaders. China
thus maintained and publicly adhered to the formal boundaries of its approach,
based upon non-interference and respect for sovereignty, whilst deploying its own
form of private influence politics with the NCP leadership. China’s use of a strat-
egy of “influence without interference” – a coherent yet ambiguous formulation –
nicely captures this approach39; “China’s ‘gentle’ diplomacy” featured “respect
for sovereignty, private persuasion, close consultations.”40 The most prominent
area where Beijing engaged in its own form of behind-the-scenes pressure politics
was in its support for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission
for Darfur, which ran contrary to the wishes of President Bashir in particular.
A second, broad departure from the established norm of China’s attitude was
demonstrated in the greater willingness of Chinese representatives and senior lea-
ders to express more public, if guarded, criticism of the NCP to the point of fea-
turing prescriptive recommendations for addressing the Darfur conflict. This was
epitomized by President Hu Jintao’s four principles for resolving Darfur
announced in Khartoum during his February 2007 state visit to Sudan, which
noted that “it is imperative to improve the situation in Darfur and living con-
ditions of the people.”41 Beijing’s official discourse evolved beyond what had for-
merly been a state-directed language to encompass civilians: President Hu’s
39 Li Anshan, “China and Africa: policy and challenges,” China Security, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2007), p. 77.
40 Wang Suolao, “Non-interference and China’s African policy: the case of Sudan,” report on Symposium
on Chinese–Sudanese Relations, 26 July 2007 (London: Centre for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2008),
pp. 16–17.
41 “Hu puts forward four-point principle on solving Darfur issue,” Xinhua, 2 February 2007.
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comments about the importance of ethnic unity and government responsibility
might be taken as a limited transcendence of the state sovereignty doctrine under-
pinning China’s approach. The upshot of these developments was that Beijing
appeared to have reasserted its position in relation to the NCP and to have become
more willing to resist its demands. This occurred within political constraints and
relations formally organized according to the principle of equality but underpinned
by asymmetrical power relations. Despite tensions, however, the differences within
Beijing–Khartoum bilateral relations should not be overstated. China disap-
pointed senior government leaders in Sudan by not defending Khartoum more
robustly (such as in not exercising its United Nations Security Council veto), but
despite international pressure the limits of the politically unacceptable were not
decisively transgressed and the Beijing Olympics may prove to have been the high-
water mark in terms of external pressure upon China’s Sudan role.
Negotiating Sovereignty: China’s Relations with Southern Sudan
A state sovereignty doctrine has remained central to the Chinese government’s
relations with Sudan and its foreign policy defence of Khartoum. Sovereignty,
like non-interference, is a reciprocal principle mirroring and projecting abroad
China’s conception of its desired politics. Apart from limited concern at the
role of Chinese companies in Sudan’s accelerated, militarized oil development
of the late 1990s,42 China had not previously been required actively to defend
Khartoum and its investment in Sudan, or justify, under scrutiny, its normative
support for an absolutist position on sovereignty. China’s steadfast support for a
hard conception of Sudan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the controversy
surrounding humanitarian intervention in Darfur was in line with, and gave prac-
tical meaning to, the sovereignty-based political framework of its Africa policy.
Underpinning Beijing’s concern at external responses advocating intervention
in Darfur has been strong belief in the proper, legitimate role of the central
state in maintaining order and avoiding political fragmentation, the importance
of political stability and the inherent danger of promoting non-consensual
“regime change” from without.
While operative in international politics, the abstraction of sovereignty has not
translated easily on to actual politics and shifting patterns of interlocking conflict
in Sudan. The result has been a divergence between the legal status of sovereignty
and its “empirical” political manifestations.43 While the central state in Khartoum
has concentrated political power and wealth it has also suffered from an underlying
weakness of central rule, meaning that it cannot maintain control over its full
territory and over time has had to make repeated attempts to co-opt local authority
42 See Human Rights Watch, Sudan, Oil and Human Rights (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003).
43 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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in order to pursue its objectives.44 The marked incongruence between state sover-
eignty as a juridical-political phenomenon and the reality of contested authority
amidst protracted armed conflict has forced Beijing to respond to the fact that
the central state in Khartoum is unable to exert effective control over its full terri-
torial jurisdiction.45 Beijing has thus had to negotiate and adapt to the politics
manifest beyond and below formal central state sovereignty, which in practice
means engagement with Sudan’s periphery and most notably Southern Sudan.
One Country, Two Systems: Sudan after the 2005 Peace Agreement
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January 2005 between the NCP
and the SPLM formally ended the North–South war, which had lasted for 22
years. International attention to Darfur had overshadowed Sudan’s North–
South political axis and also meant that Beijing’s incremental steps to develop
relations with and invest in Southern Sudan, a much less prominent but neverthe-
less important evolution, was neglected. Given that the Chinese government faith-
fully dealt with governments in Khartoum between 1959 and 2005, this has
entailed a departure from Beijing’s hitherto exclusive relations with the central
state.46 Relations that developed between China and the SPLM-led Government
of Southern Sudan after 2005 thus represent a political departure of note in the
history of its relations with Sudan. This development is an underlying reflection
of the constraints of adhering to a strict policy of respecting formal state
sovereignty as well as the political complexity involved in maintaining economic
interests in Sudan.
The CPA instituted different systems in Northern and Southern Sudan,
establishing two governing entities as part of a six-year interim period: a
Khartoum-based Government of National Unity operating on a power-sharing
basis between the NCP and the SPLM, and the semi-autonomous regional
Government of Southern Sudan based in the new southern capital of Juba
under control of the SPLM. The agreement also included a wealth-sharing pro-
vision, which enabled Southern Sudan to receive a share of oil profits. The most
politically significant provision of the agreement, however, is its assertion “that
the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia, through
a referendum to determine their future status.” The CPA stipulates that such a
referendum will be staged in 2011 “for the people of South Sudan to: confirm
the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established
44 Conflict in Darfur is a recent manifestation of a historical pattern of the state’s mobilization of proxy
militia, following the deployment of this tactic in the war in Southern Sudan.
45 See Christopher Clapham, “Fitting China in,” in Chris Alden, Daniel Large and Ricardo Soares de
Oliveira (eds.), China Returns to Africa (London: Hurst, 2008), pp. 361–69.
46 Beijing did not support Anyanya 1, the earlier Southern Sudanese rebellion that ended with a peace
agreement in 1972, which might have been viewed by the PRC as a worthy people’s struggle. This
was in contrast to its support for “revolutionary armed conflict” in other parts of Africa. Beijing con-
tinued to support Khartoum, having apparently concluded that any other policy would jeopardize
relations with a friendly government and China’s wider interests in the Middle East.
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under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession.”47 The SPLM’s official pos-
ition has been to support its constitutional obligation to “make unity attractive,”
although opinion is divided on the issue of secession.48 Since 2005, Southern
Sudan has effectively been “operating as a quasi-independent state.”49
China’s relations with Juba can be said to fall under the principle of “one
Sudan, two systems” in recognizing and engaging Sudan’s central Government
of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan.50 As recommended
in a report published in 2001, this formula proposed an interim political arrange-
ment of a single united Sudan involving “two, viable, self-governing democratic
regions, north and south.”51 Enshrined in the CPA, this allowed the historic pro-
blem of Southern Sudan’s position within Sudan to be addressed and politically
accommodated.52 The formal, legal incorporation of the SPLM into the central
Government of National Unity rendered it politically and legally possible on
paper for Beijing – like other foreign governments from Africa and beyond –
to engage the SPLM and Juba directly. By conferring political legitimacy upon
the SPLM as members of the central state and as the former-rebels turned ruling
party of the Government of Southern Sudan, the CPA therefore enabled but
also required Beijing to embark on a process of incremental political outreach
with Juba.
Even if China’s relations with the SPLM were legally sanctioned within the
terms of the CPA, political outreach with Southern Sudan presented particular
challenges for Beijing due to its previous wartime political, economic and military
support for the central government in Khartoum. China had not dealt with the
SPLM before in any formal capacity; its support for the NIF/NCP meant that it
was widely seen as the principal backer of the SPLA/M’s former enemy. What
Beijing presented as non-interference in Sudan’s internal affairs was interpreted
by the SPLM in quite different terms: as interference through support for its
enemy. Nevertheless, the conjunction of time-honoured pragmatism, mutual
need and the prospect of mutual benefit meant that both the Chinese government
and the Government of Southern Sudan were open to business after 2005. The
SPLM’s post-war China policy was premised on constructive engagement and
working with former enemies.53 After devastating conflicts, Southern Sudan’s
need for investment was considerable. The scheduled referendum, coupled with
47 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005), p. 4, para. 2.5. Full version at www.sudanarchive.net.
48 Popular Southern sentiment tends to support the vision of independence more than the SPLM’s John
Garang-inspired vision of a united, reformed and democratic “new Sudan.”
49 Peter Adwok Nyaba, “An appraisal of contemporary China–Sudan relations and its future trajectory,”
paper presented at the Centre for Advanced Studies of African Societies, 23–24 November 2005.
50 China is not alone in doing so, with other foreign governments from Africa and beyond doing the same.
51 “US policy to end Sudan’s war: report of the CSIS task force on US–Sudan policy,” co-chairs Francis
M. Deng and J. Stephen Morrison (Washington, DC: CSIS, February 2001).
52 This principle appeared to have been inspired by Deng Xiaoping’s recommendations in 1984 for a prac-
tical means to accommodate socialist China’s relations with capitalist Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.
53 Conversations with senior SPLM leaders, Juba, December 2005.
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the geography of CNPC’s main oil fields, most influenced Beijing’s need to respond
to the new political reality in Juba.
Emerging Links: China’s Relations with Southern Sudan
A progressive strengthening of relations between Juba and Beijing unfolded after
2005, resulting in the Chinese government establishing quasi-diplomatic relations
with the Government of Southern Sudan in 2008. The first official contact between
Beijing and the SPLM was made when a high-ranking SPLM delegation visited
Beijing in March 2005 to discuss possible “economic co-operation.” The delegation
was led by Salva Kiir Mayardit, who was second-in-command to John Garang and
vice-president of Southern Sudan at the time. Following Garang’s unexpected
death four months later on 30 July 2005, he became First-Vice-President of Sudan
and President of Southern Sudan. Subsequent further contacts of note included a
meeting between Salva Kiir and President Hu Jintao in Khartoum in February
2007 and a state visit by Salva Kiir to China in July 2007 where he wore two
political hats: the official second highest political position within Sudan’s Govern-
ment of National Unity, and leader of Southern Sudan. The process whereby
official ties were established was confirmed when China’s new consulate in Juba
was inaugurated at a ceremony attended by Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun
on 1 September 2008. This move formalized the new diplomatic axis between
Juba and Beijing, allowing China to engage Southern Sudan in its own, bilateral
terms rather than having relations mediated through Khartoum.
Beijing’s relations with the Government of Southern Sudan subsequently deep-
ened – through aid54 and expanded investment55 – and broadened to encompass
other political actors. A less developed but growing area of political engagement
has been CCP–SPLM party–party co-operation. The SPLM secretary general,
Pagan Amum, reported that during Salva Kiir’s 2007 trip to China, the CCP
invited the SPLM to establish party–party links and that the SPLM planned
“to establish relations” with the CCP in order “to ensure efficient development
54 China’s aid to Southern Sudan was to be increased following an official Chinese needs assessment mis-
sion to Juba in mid-2007. A number of projects, from hydropower to road construction, were planned.
In early April 2009, the Chinese Consul General in Juba donated a grant of $100,000 to the Government
of Southern Sudan from Beijing.
55 An expanded Chinese commercial involvement is a further dimension of Chinese engagement with
Southern Sudan. There had been little of substance beyond Chinese oil operations prior to 2005 but
the CPA opened up a new frontier of business opportunity. At first Chinese construction work was pro-
minent in Juba. Chinese companies entered via Kenyan and Ugandan brokers in the form of private
joint ventures. The Nile Construction Company, for example, entered into a joint venture with
the Chinese company Golden Nest in October 2006 to work on construction projects. The China
National Overseas Engineering Company renovated government buildings and the Juba Teaching
Hospital for the Government of Southern Sudan. A small Chinese service sector subsequently devel-
oped. This featured the prefabricated Beijing Juba Hotel, which suffered fire damage in February
2009, and the “Wonderful Chinese Restaurant” established by a Chinese businesswoman from
Wenzhou who had identified an open market. Conversation in Juba, 18 June 2008. China’s actions
impressed elements within the Government of Southern Sudan by swift, effective delivery of infrastruc-
ture, a contrast to the slow-turning wheels of the multilateral assistance framework.
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and management of oil resources to the benefit of the Sudanese people.”56
Chinese political and corporate relations with Southern Sudan have not been
confined to the Government of Southern Sudan in Juba but have also featured
connections with state authorities. An example of engagement by an oil-rich
Southern Sudanese state with the Chinese government and CNPC happened in
August 2008 when the governor of Upper Nile State,57 Gatluak Deng Garang
(an NCP representative), made an official visit to China. He met Chinese govern-
ment representatives, visited CNPC and sought to negotiate expanded Chinese
investment in Malakal, the state capital.58
China’s engagement aims to support Juba and promote China’s position in
Southern Sudan. It has acted in part to address its acknowledged unpopularity
and gain a more strategic political foothold in Southern Sudan. It remains question-
able, however, how far China’s relations with governing political elites in Juba can
overcome continuing widespread grievances amongst communities in oil-producing
regions of Southern Sudan. Local grievances are not confined to Chinese oil compa-
nies. While most immediately directed toward oil companies and their operations,
grievances express more general frustrations at the lack of a tangible “peace
dividend” and compensation for thewartime impact on civilians of oil development.59
China’s links with Juba contrast with the way in which relations had developed
with Northern Sudan after 1989.60 In the earlier period, resource imperatives and
investment opportunitywere paramount.While state-backed and facilitated through
political means, this was a commercially driven entry into a new theatre. In engaging
theGovernment of Southern Sudan, however, Beijing responded to political impera-
tives flowing from investment protection concerns produced by established interests
as part of an apparent hedging strategy geared toward the possibility of Southern
secession. China’s engagement has been successful in improving relations with the
Government of Southern Sudan and the SPLM, establishing a foothold in Juba
and opening up a new business frontier. Like other external actors, it remains subject
to the continuing constraints and myriad problems facing the Government of
Southern Sudan. These range from the institutional challenges involved in building
a functioning, capable system of government, to fiscal crisis resulting largely from
massive dependency on oil revenue,61 as well as infrastructure needs and continuing
and new “south–south” conflicts.
56 Organizational Report Presented to the Second National Convention of the Sudan People Liberation
Movement by SPLM Secretary-General Pagan Amum Okiech, 18 May 2008.
57 The state in which Petrodar concessions are located.
58 CNPC appeared keen to co-operate with Upper Nile state authorities, and would, through the Petrodar
consortium, contribute infrastructure projects to Malakal, which demonstrated business relations
between the foremost Chinese oil company in Sudan and a state government.
59 See Leben Moro, “Oil, conflict and displacement in Sudan,” DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2008.
60 Thanks to Laura James for pointing this out.
61 Oil accounted for roughly 99% of total Government of Southern Sudan revenues in 2006 and over 98%
in 2008. See “Government of Southern Sudan. 2009 budget speech,” Kuol Athian Mawien, Minister of
Finance and Economic Planning, presentation to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, 10
December 2008.
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Conclusion
The golden jubilee celebrations ended on 22 March 2009 in Khartoum’s
Chinese-built Friendship Hall. Amidst rhetoric about the bright prospects for
future relations, the festivities had been tantamount to a celebration of the past
two decades of China’s relations with the NIF/NCP. Over this period, the politics
of China’s Sudan engagement became more complicated with the development of
a “thicker,” more embedded and consequential Chinese role within Sudan. Due
to a combination of Sudan’s recent salience in China’s foreign relations and its
changed politics in different parts of the country, China’s interests evolved
beyond resource extraction or business concerns. Beijing had developed two
main interconnected processes of engagement amidst ongoing conflict in the wes-
tern region of Darfur and the new political geography of Sudan’s North–South
formal peace. Having developed vested interests in the political stability of the
central state, peace in Darfur, the fledgling Government of Southern Sudan
and, overall, in the success of the CPA, China evolved a “comprehensive
approach” to Sudan.62 Given the strong potential for Chinese oil companies
and CNPC in particular to be negatively affected by renewed armed conflict in
Southern Sudan through a terminal breakdown of relations between the NCP
and the SPLM, the political guarantors of the CPA, Beijing’s priorities became
more concerned with investment protection imperatives rooted in political stab-
ility and preserving the North–South peace. The extent to which the Chinese gov-
ernment can or is inclined to play a more engaged role in protecting the CPA,
however, and in particular to mobilize its influence politics with the NCP on
core issues in CPA implementation, is questionable but remains a subject of
some significance in Sudan’s political future.
The fundamental challenge faced by China in relation to its Sudan engagement
was the nature and prospects of the central state under the NCP. Because it con-
fers prior legitimacy upon a partner state’s actions, even in cases like the extremes
of violence unleashed in Southern Sudan and Darfur, China’s official approach
will almost by definition be necessarily reactive. Sudan has tested the limits of
this approach. While China and Sudan’s respective and mutually understood
national interests were subjected to strain, divergent interests were effectively
managed in a process that demonstrates the continuation of robust bilateral
ties amidst wide international controversy and negative impact on Beijing’s repu-
tational concerns. Conflict in Darfur continued in 2009 and the prospects of a
political resolution are poor. The scheduled referendum on Southern Sudanese
secession, in which the outcome most desired by many Southerners is an indepen-
dent state, is fundamental to the political future of Sudan. This historic scenario
remains fraught with attendant danger and political contestation. Beijing has suc-
ceeded in developing the basis of political relations with Juba but the extent to
62 As well as continued peacekeeping support, Beijing also made public statements on the CPA and sup-
port gestures, such as a donation of US$3 million to the NCP to support the CPA in late 2008.
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which its new relations with the SPLM will prove strong enough to withstand a
return to open conflict between Northern and Southern Sudan is questionable.
Aspects of China’s experience in Sudan are more broadly applicable, in differ-
ent ways, to its African role. The first concerns the political agency of African
states and other actors, and how this affects China’s politics within different
states as well as its foreign policy impact, including on relations with more estab-
lished powers, most importantly the United States. A related issue is how tensions
created by the distance between China’s formal principle of sovereign equality
and the actual asymmetry of power relations are managed when confronted
with divergent interests of consequence. A second, and connected, issue is how
the central Chinese government and national oil companies, in this case, manage
relations with different “non-state” actors in Sudan (not to mention the role of
transnational actors). In the broader scheme of its African experience, China’s
relations with the quasi-sovereign Government of Southern Sudan mark an inter-
esting departure even if these are consistent with a legally sanctioned political
arrangement. Chinese oil companies have been caught up in and remain vulner-
able to renewed conflict as a more exposed potential target for groups seeking to
apply leverage against Khartoum by targeting its strategic allies. This begs the
thorny question of how China’s investment protection imperatives, which
in Sudan have been produced by over a decade of economic engagement, can
in practice be reconciled with adherence to a faithful operationalization of the
principle of non-interference.
Sudan offers a salient case of a more widespread deficiency in approaches to
China’s relations with Africa to date in terms of how China’s engagement is
involved in and relates to African politics. While a subject that has attracted
wide reactions in relation to governance concerns, in general this has yet to
receive the in-depth treatment its growing importance deserves. As the single
most controversial relation in China’s recent, most visible and potentially conse-
quential rise in Africa, Sudan has often been misleadingly elevated in monolithic
representations of China’s entire continental engagement despite bearing its own
specificities. It nevertheless remains an important case, partly because China’s
involvement predated the acceleration of its wider African engagement and as
such provides an illustration of the importance of politics in conditioning
China’s experience over time, but also due to the changing nature and trajectories
of its political role. How the shifting constellation of actors grouped under the
phrase “China” relates to, and affects, politics in Sudan and the African conti-
nent more generally, and how an expansive engagement is shaped by African
politics and influences China’s international politics, looks set to remain inescap-
able and important.
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